<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Market-Design on Mereth Labs</title><link>https://mereth.dev/topics/market-design/</link><description>Recent content in Market-Design on Mereth Labs</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en_GB</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 20 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0530</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://mereth.dev/topics/market-design/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The Signalling Problem</title><link>https://mereth.dev/problems/credential-competency/</link><pubDate>Tue, 20 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate><guid>https://mereth.dev/problems/credential-competency/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;The labour market needs to sort people by what they can do. With no cheap,
trustworthy signal of competence to go on, it falls back on the degree: a four-year,
five-figure proxy that bundles thousands of unrelated skills into one credential
and certifies none of them precisely.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>